source of identity change. Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) is the most common form of dementia after AD (Snowden, Neary, & Mann, 2002) . In the behavioral subtype of FTD, prefrontal cortex dysfunction leads to moral impairments, including dishonesty, inappropriate behavior, reduced empathy, and diminished concern for social norms (S. W. Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Manoochehri & Huey, 2012; McKhann et al., 2001; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005) . While FTD affects traits that psychologists associate with the core self , direct evidence that FTD disrupts personal identity exists only in hints from case studies (as when the wife of a patient lamented, "It is as if a different person has crawled into [his] skin"; Mathews et al., 2009, p. 56) .
Memories and morality are but two candidates for sources of identity change; many others have been proposed, including depression (Kramer, 1993) and aphasia (Shadden, 2005) . It is also possible that overall degree of mental deterioration is all that matters. While previous work has examined the influence of brain damage on identity from the patient's perspective, the present investigation measured a crucial construct that has gone virtually unstudied in neuropsychology: how identity recognition is affected for people observing the brain-damaged patient. In addition to providing a novel perspective on the wider social ramifications of neurodegenerative disease, this measure sidesteps some of the problems of reliability inherent to first-person reports. Anosognosia (lack of disease awareness) is comorbid with dementia (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991) , and the ability to compare the current self with past selves is confounded with the severity of memory impairment (Eustache et al., 2013) .
The primary aim of this study was to determine the influence of neurodegenerative symptomatology on third-person judgments of personal identity. Rather than focus on one symptom or individual at a time, we compared a variety of mental deficits in order to model the independent contribution of each toward identity persistence. Collecting data from multiple diseases also provides an opportunity to generalize beyond the bounds of a single neurological disorder. Scholarship devoted to the nature of identity tends to be limited to armchair speculation (Locke, 1690 (Locke, /2009 Parfit, 1971) or asking subjects to imagine hypothetical scenarios (Blok, Newman, Behr, & Rips, 2001; Nichols & Bruno, 2010; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) . The present design allowed us to bring these theories to bear on real cases of brain damage.
A subsidiary goal of this investigation was to test the broader impact that identity change has on outcomes related to well-being. In particular, we focused on how relationship quality deteriorates as a function of cognitive impairment. Thus, we not only demonstrated the practical importance of identity persistence, but also identified a new potential risk factor that neurodegenerative disease places on family, caregivers, and communities.
Method
We focused on family members from three patient populations: FTD, AD, and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). ALS served as a control condition. While ALS is a neurodegenerative disease, its effects are largely on motor functions (though psychological faculties are sometimes affected; Ringholz et al., 2005) .
Participants
Participants were recruited by posting study notices to online support groups for friends and family of those suffering from FTD, AD, and ALS. Two hundred forty-eight volunteers completed the study. For structural equation modeling, a minimum sample of 200 is generally recommended (Kline, 2005; Lei & Wu, 2007) ; we continued collecting data past this point until the pool of volunteers had been exhausted.
Sixty-six additional participants (21% of the total) started but did not finish the study. This attrition rate likely reflects the study's length and its wholly voluntary nature. An independent samples Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant difference in attrition rate across disease type.
Thirty-one percent of patients were diagnosed with FTD (n = 76), 46% with AD (n = 114), and 23% with ALS (n = 58). The pool of participants was an international sample from largely English-speaking countries (81% American, 8% Canadian, 5% British, 2% Australian, 2% other). Participants were 85% female and 15% male; 79% of the patients they described were male, and 21% were female. There were no interaction effects between disease type and participant or patient gender, Fs < 1, n.s.
Seventy-four percent of participants were responding about their spouse or domestic partner; the next most common patient category was parent (8%). Most (79%) participants interacted with the patient on a daily basis, and almost all interacted on a weekly basis (92%). Participants began noticing symptoms an average of 8 years prior to taking the survey (SD = 5), with no significant difference across disease type, Fs < 1, n.s.
Procedure
The study was administered as an online survey. Participants were told that the purpose of the research was to investigate how neurodegenerative disease affected personal relationships. After reporting the patient's primary condition (FTD, AD, or ALS), participants indicated the extent to which the patient exhibited an array of symptoms typical of that disease (Table 1) . Participants received a different list of symptoms depending on the primary disease; there was partial overlap in items across disease types, including amnesia, aphasia (language impairment), and apraxia (impairment of voluntary motor control). Depression was included because it often co-occurs with these diseases. Each symptom was rated on a scale from 0 to 4 (none, mild, moderate, severe, and, for symptoms where applicable, complete).
Participants filled out the Morality-Personality Scale (MoPeS), which is a hybrid of the Virtues Scale (Cawley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000) and the Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992) . The MoPeS consists of 64 individual-difference traits presented as three-adjective clusters, and it has been successfully used in previous work (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) . The traits vary in how closely related to morality they are, as determined by a prior norming study.
1 These ratings were used to divide the traits into the 15 most moralized ("moral") traits and 15 least moralized ("personality") traits. This division allowed us to test whether all dispositional traits play a role in perceived identity or whether moral traits are especially important. In labeling the least moralized traits "personality," we followed the convention that personality represents individual-difference traits that are unrelated to moral character (Allport, 1921 (Allport, , 1927 cf. Peterson & Seligman, 2004) . Participants indicated how much the patient had changed on each trait since the onset of the disease using a bipolar scale from −2 (exhibits trait much less) to 2 (exhibits trait much more), with 0 (no change) at the midpoint. This scale allowed us to measure change on two dimensions: absolute amount of change and valence of change (positive or negative). (For a box plot of MoPeS scores by condition, see Fig. S1 in the Supplemental Material available online.) Note: The first three items were rated on a scale from 1 to 5, the fourth was rated from 0 to 100, and the last was rated from 1 to 4. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
To assess the nature of the relationship between respondent and patient, we asked participants to provide information about how often they see the patient, how they are related to the patient, and how much their relationship had deteriorated since disease onset. Following these were questions designed to measure perceived identity change. Four items were aimed at identity specifically: "Do you feel like you still know who the patient is?" (rated from 1, not at all, to 5, completely), "How would you characterize the changes the patient has experienced?" (rated from 0, superficial-they are just surface changes, to 100, deep-they fundamentally change who the person is), "Regardless of the severity of the illness, how much do you sense that the patient is still the same person underneath?" (rated from 1, not at all, to 5, completely), and "Does the patient ever seem like a stranger to you?" (rated from 1, no, not at all, to 4, yes, all the time). The degree to which the patient's illness impacted daily functioning was treated as a control (Table 2) .
Results
Structural, measurement, and mediation models were run in Amos (Version 22; Arbuckle, 2006) . Principal component analysis and reliability analyses were performed in SPSS (Version 22). All other analyses were performed in R statistical software (Version 3.1; R Development Core Team, 2014).
A clear pattern emerges when considering identity change as a function of disease type ( Fig. 1 and Table 2 ). A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare the effects of disease type (FTD, AD, ALS) and identity question (the four questions relating to identity) on perceived identity. There was a significant main effect of disease type, F(2, 245) = 39.63, p < .001. There was no main effect of identity question, nor was there an interaction effect between identity question and disease type, Fs < 1.
Because there was no significant difference between responses across the four identity questions, we computed the mean of the four identity ratings per participant and used this as the dependent measure of perceived identity change for the pairwise comparisons by disease type. These t tests revealed that AD leads to greater identity disruption than ALS, Welch's t(112) = 6.50, p < .0001, d = 1.05, and FTD leads to greater identity disruption than either ALS, t(115) = 8.75, p < .0001, d = 1.54, or AD, t(170) = 3.04, p = .003, d = 0.45. This result cannot be attributed to differences in the severity of the diseases, as an ANOVA showed no correspondence between the dependent measure of daily functioning and the independent measure of disease type, F(2, 245) = 1.46, n.s.
This analysis provides initial evidence that the moral faculty contributes to perceived identity more than does memory or nonpsychological neural faculties such as voluntary motor control, and that there are overall differences in how these neurodegenerative diseases affect perceived identity persistence. To examine the role of specific cognitive impairments on perceived identity within and across disease types, we turned to structural equation modeling (SEM).
Main structural equation model
SEM is a hybridization of factor analysis and path analysis (Ullman, 2006; Ullman & Bentler, 2001) . SEM has several advantages, including the ability to explicitly account for measurement error, to combine observed and unobserved (latent) variables into the same model, and to resolve multicollinearity by positing latent constructs. SEM measures the effect of multiple independent variables on dependent constructs, establishing not only the existence of their relationship but also quantifying their relative strength. SEM is preferable to multiple, smaller mediation analyses because it allows for direct comparison and control of all variables of interest and is more parsimonious (Hayes, 2009) . SEM is particularly wellsuited to neuropsychology, because patients with the same diagnosis can manifest constellations of symptoms to differing degrees and can exhibit symptoms that would fit under the umbrella of multiple conditions (e.g., many ALS patients also meet the diagnostic criteria for FTD; Ringholz et al., 2005) .
Because there were different numerical-scale anchors depending on the item, all variables were standardized and centered (and, where appropriate, reverse-scored) before analysis. Prior research using statistical simulations indicates that a higher number of indicators per construct is preferred, with four or more indicators per factor necessary for proper model fit (Marsh, Hau, Balla, & Grayson, 1998) . Thus, there were 15 observed variables each in the latent factors for moral traits and personality traits, and 4 observed variables in the latent factor for perceived identity (Table 3) .
A confirmatory factor analysis supported the fit of these three latent factors, χ 2 (524) = 940, χ 2 /degrees of freedom (CMIN/DF) = 1.79, p < .001; comparative fit index (CFI) = .904, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .057. Standardized estimates for indicator variables were generally above 0.5 (Table 3) . Tests of Cronbach's alpha revealed that the latent factor for identity exhibited a high level of reliability (4 items; α = .840), as did the moral-traits factor (15 items; α = .935) and the personality-traits factor (15 items; α = .913). There were no items that increased reliability if removed, so all were retained for the analysis.
The structural model treated common shared cognitivebehavioral changes across the three disease types as predictor variables. Five of the predictor variables were observed (apraxia, amnesia, aphasia, depression, disease duration), and the other two were latent variables as established in the measurement model (personality and moral traits). All predictor variables were allowed to covary. The identity factor served as the sole criterion variable. The relationships between the predictor and criterion variables are summarized in Table 4 and Figure 2a .
Structural analysis supported model fit, χ 2 (679) = 1,175, CMIN/DF = 1.73, p < .001; CFI = .894, RMSEA = .054, based on standard cutoff criteria (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006) . Together, the independent variables accounted for 65% of all variance (R 2 ) in identity change. Table  2 for the full questions. Error bars represent standard errors.
Far and away the most powerful predictor of perceived identity change was moral change, β = 0.73, p < .001 ( Fig. 2a and Table 4 ). Aphasia exhibited a weaker but reliable effect, β = 0.15, p = .01. No other symptom in the model-apraxia, depression, amnesia, personality change-had a measurable impact on perceived identity.
FTD model
Participants in the FTD and AD conditions answered additional scale-based questions about symptoms specific to these respective diseases.
2 Disease-specific models therefore allowed us to examine the influence of morality, memory, and other cognitive systems in richer detail. Specifically for the FTD condition, using a measure of morality that is symptom-based rather than trait-based provided a means for reinforcing our theoretical model that moral change plays a central role in identity disruption. FTD is accompanied by symptoms relating to loss of executive function. Some of these affect moral behavior (e.g., antisocial behavior, loss of social inhibitions), and some do not (e.g., decreased motivation, repetitive compulsive behavior). We analyzed participants in the FTD condition (n = 76) to determine whether an alternative measure of moral change-symptoms related to moral behavior-also influences perceived identity and to determine what general role (if any) frontal lobe dysfunction plays in perceived identity.
Principal component analysis of the FTD-specific symptoms (Table 5) revealed that four symptoms split into a factor related to moral concerns: (a) antisocial behavior, (b) apathy, (c) reduced empathy, and (d) reduced social inhibitions and inappropriate behavior. These served as observed endogenous variables for the morality factor (4 items; α = .78). The measurement model for the latent factors (morality and identity) indicated good model fit, χ 2 (19.1) = 28.7, CMIN/DF = 1.51, p = .07; CFI = .944, RMSEA = .083.
The observed exogenous variables in the FTD structural model were decreased motivation, paranoia and delusions, decreased personal hygiene, hyperorality, increased sex drive, repetitive compulsive behavior, amnesia, and apraxia. Three items that were highly correlated with the morality factor-difficulty paying attention, blunted affect, and agitation-were not included in the model to prevent indeterminacy arising from collinearity. These three symptoms are, however, part of the AD model presented in the following section.
Structural analysis supported model fit, χ 2 (73.0) = 119, CMIN/DF = 1.64, p = .001; CFI = .833, RMSEA = .092. Moral injury exerted strong and exclusive control over perceived identity in FTD patients, β = 0.80, p < .001. No other FTD symptom had a significant impact on identity (see Table 6 Note: The structural model is displayed graphically in Figure 2a .
by guest on September 14, 2015 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from and Fig. 2b ). When the four-factor symptom-based morality factor was replaced with the 15-factor trait-based morality factor used in the other structural equation models, the same findings emerged (see Table S3 in the Supplemental Material). Including personality as a predictor revealed no impact of personality change on perceived identity and, furthermore, reduced model fit (Table S3) .
AD model
Our aim in the analysis targeted at AD participants (n = 114) was to determine whether specific memory deficits affect perceived identity. This analysis also allowed us to see whether moral change continues to exert an influence on identity even in patients for whom moral deterioration is not the primary or characteristic symptom of the disease.
Participants in the AD group responded to items characteristic of that disease. These included difficulty planning, disorientation and confusion, paranoia, difficulty paying attention, agitation, aphasia, depression, and blunted affect. Different forms of memory deficit were also probed (Table 1) .
The AD structural model contained three latent factors-morality, amnesia, and identity. The morality and personality factors were composed of the same two sets of 15 traits used in the main model. Factor analysis on six memory-related items revealed that five items formed a coherent factor: deterioration of episodic memory, semantic memory, memory for personally meaningful Note: The structural model is displayed graphically in Figure 2b . information, memory for generic information, and memory for old information (α = .85). 3 A measurement model of the three latent factors demonstrated good fit, χ 2 (249) = 316, CMIN/DF = 1.27, p = .003; CFI = .939, RMSEA = .049.
The observed exogenous variables in the structural model were blunted affect, depression, agitation, paranoia, difficulty paying attention, difficulty planning, disorientation, and aphasia (Table 7) . Two items-agnosia and apraxia-that produced Heywood cases were removed to avoid collinearity (Heywood, 1931) . Structural analysis supported model fit, χ 2 (417) = 554, CMIN/DF = 1.33, p < .001; CFI = .905, RMSEA = .054. This model showed that moral-trait change is the sole predictor of identity change in Alzheimer's patients, β = 0.56, p < .001 (see Table 8 and Fig. 2c) . No other symptoms reached significance, including the amnesia factor and the emotional-trait items (blunted affect, depression, and agitation). In an alternative model, the amnesia items were treated as exogenous variables instead, and none of them influenced perceived identity (all ps > .2). As with the FTD condition, a model including the personality factor reduced fit and revealed no significant effect of personality on perceived identity (see Table S4 in the Supplemental Material).
Relationship-deterioration model
We next tested whether identity change has a reliable downstream effect on social bonds. To determine whether perceived identity explains the effect of psychological change on relationship deterioration, we ran a multiple mediation bootstrap analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) . This model resembles the main structural equation model but with relationship deterioration as the dependent variable and perceived identity as the potential mediator between the independent variables (morality, personality, amnesia, aphasia, apraxia, depression, duration) and relationship deterioration (Fig. 3) .
As with perceived identity, moral change had the greatest impact on relationship deterioration, β = 0.59, p = .002, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.40, 0.76], and aphasia a smaller effect, β = 0.15, p = .015, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.27]. None of the other predictor variables, including disease duration, had an influence on relationship deterioration. When identity was Note: The structural model is displayed graphically in Figure 2c . An alternative hypothesis is that relationship deterioration leads to perceived identity change, rather than vice versa. To test this possibility, we ran an alternative model in which relationship deterioration was the mediating variable and identity the dependent variable. The standardized estimates in this model were weaker than in the original model. The effect of relationship deterioration on identity was β = 0.42, whereas the effect of identity on relationship deterioration was β = 0.70; the total effect of morality on identity was β = 0.50, whereas the indirect effect of morality on identity was β = 0.75. These results suggest that the best available account of the data is the causal path laid out in the original model (Fig. 3) .
Discussion
These findings support the view that identity is at risk for deteriorating during neurodegeneration primarily when the moral system is impaired. Aphasia also exerts an influence, though this effect is weaker and does not reliably show up in all models (e.g., in the AD model). The primacy of morality in determining identity holds up even for dementia types in which moral impairment is not the characteristic or dominant feature. This effect is observed whether moral change is measured as a function of changes in moral traits or symptomatology related to moral behavior.
These results speak to significant and longstanding questions about the nature of identity, questions that have occupied social scientists, neurologists, philosophers, and novelists alike. Identity has variously been located in memories (Locke, 1690 (Locke, /2009 ), distinctiveness (Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000) , and dispositional emotion (S. Klein, 2013) . The current results support the essential-moral-self hypothesis: As long as core moral capacities are preserved, perceived identity will remain largely intact (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) .
This investigation dovetails nicely with existing socialcognition work demonstrating that moral character is at the heart of person perception (N. H. Anderson, 1968; Goodwin et al., 2014; Wojciszke et al., 1998) . Our results show that the primacy of morality extends beyond impression formation to individual-identity recognition more generally. We suspect this commonality may reflect a shared mechanism or mechanisms between forming impressions and recognizing individuals.
The role of the language system in identity continuity has received little attention (Shadden, 2005) , though the present results with aphasia highlight it as a promising area for future research. Self-expression and communication may be an important component of perceived identity.
Social psychologists have often focused on identity from the first-person perspective (Baumeister, 1998; Erikson, 1968) , but there has been relatively little empirical work directed at third-person recognition of individual identities (cf. Blok et al., 2001; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) . This is a notable omission from the literature, as determining individual identities and tracking them over time is surely of central importance to people's lives as social animals.
A key question for future research is whether the privileging of moral traits we observed in recognition of other people extends to recognition of the self. Systematic biases in self-estimation, especially in the moral dimension, suggest that competence may be especially important to self-directed identity judgments (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Epley & Dunning, 2000) . While there is evidence that moral values are of central importance in self-directed judgments of personal identity, this effect may be less pronounced (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young, 2015) . The identity crises that underlie cases of moral injury, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (Maguen & Litz, 2012) , suggest that our findings may well extend to real-world selfdirected experiences of identity disruption.
Neurodegeneration is just one instance of psychological change that can arise from multiple causes-some organic and some psychiatric, some clinical and some healthy. For this reason, the findings reported here may apply more broadly to psychological change across the human life span.
An estimated 36 million people are living with neurodegenerative disease worldwide (World Health Organization & Alzheimer's Disease International, 2012) . While loss of identity may be feared as an undesirable clinical outcome unto itself, the present research highlights that identity deterioration has significant downstream consequences for healthy relationships. The devastation of these diseases extends beyond functional impairments and indeed extends beyond the patients themselves. Future therapies ought to be aimed at-and take into account-preserving moral function, a previously unappreciated factor in the well-being of patients and their families.
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Notes
1. In a separate study, 113 participants were recruited online. Participants used a Likert-type scale to rate each trait's desirability (1-7), positivity (1-7), and relation to morality (1-5). All participants rated all traits on all dimensions. Trait order was randomized between participants, and question order was fixed. The scale is designed such that traits can be desirable or positive without being related to morality. For instance, intelligence and sense of humor are rated as being highly desirable but having a low association with morality. (See Table S1 in the Supplemental Material available online for the full scale and results of the norming study.) 2. Although participants in the ALS condition also filled out symptom-specific survey questions, we did not create a separate model for ALS. There were fewer participants in this condition, so it is unlikely we could draw any reliable conclusions from a structural equation model. Creating a model of ALS patients is also unlikely to advance active theoretical debates, as no one in the literature has argued that identity primarily resides in motor control. 3. Difficulty remembering new information did not fit well onto the amnesia factor, corrected item-total correlation = .391. It was therefore excluded from the final analysis. However, including this item in the structural equation model, either as part of the amnesia factor or as a separate observed exogenous variable, did not change the statistical significance of the results.
